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Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 
 
Nick Coons; Eric Novack; U.S.     ) 
Representatives Jeff Flake; and     ) 
Trent Franks,          ) 
        Plaintiffs,  ) 
v.            )  
            )  CV-10-1714-PHX-GMS 
Timothy Geithner, in his official capacity as  ) 
Secretary of the United States Department  )  SECOND AMENDED CIVIL 
of the Treasury; Kathleen Sebelius, in her  )  RIGHTS COMPLAINT FOR 
official capacity as Secretary of the United  )  DECLARATORY AND  
States Department of Health and Human   )  INJUNCTIVE RELIEF   
Services; Eric H. Holder, Jr., in his official  ) 
capacity as Attorney General of the United  ) 
States; and Barack Hussein Obama, in his  ) 
official capacity as President of the    ) 
United States,         ) 
            ) 
        Defendants. ) 
 
 Plaintiffs Nick Coons, Eric Novack and United States Representatives Jeff Flake 
and Trent Franks (collectively “Plaintiffs”), by and through their undersigned counsel, 
bring this Second Amended Complaint against the above-named Defendants, their 
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employees, agents and successors in office.  In support of this Second Amended 
Complaint, Plaintiffs allege the following upon information and belief: 
INTRODUCTION 
 1. The federal government does not have the constitutional power to mandate 
that Plaintiff Nick Coons and other American citizens purchase health insurance, much 
less surrender their medical privacy and autonomy, as a condition of living in the United 
States.  Further, Congress has no constitutional power to subject Plaintiff Eric Novack to 
regulations of a federal agency to which Congress has delegated nearly unlimited 
legislative power, much less to entrench health care regulations against review, debate, 
revision or repeal by Plaintiffs Jeff Flake and Trent Franks or any other elected U.S. 
Representative or Senator.  Such federal overreaching must be rejected if the principles 
of limited government and the separation of powers established by the United States 
Constitution mean anything.   
 2. Accordingly, Plaintiffs request a declaration by this Court that the federal 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (“the Act” or “PPACA”), Pub. L. 
No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), as amended by the Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) (“HCERA”), 
both facially and as applied to them, violates the United States Constitution. 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
 3. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1340 and 
1346(a)(2).   
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 4. This Court is authorized to grant declaratory and injunctive relief under 5 
U.S.C. §§ 701 through 706, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202, Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure 57 and 65, and by the general legal and equitable powers of the federal 
judiciary.  
 5. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(2). 
PARTIES 
 6. Plaintiff Nick Coons is a citizen of the United States and the State of Arizona, 
residing in the City of Tempe, within the jurisdiction of this Court.  Plaintiff Coons is 32 
years of age, does not have private health insurance, objects to being compelled by the 
federal government through the passage of the Act to purchase health care coverage and 
objects to being compelled to share his private medical history with third parties.  He is 
not: a) a religious conscientious objector to the Act; b) a member of a health care 
ministry; c) a member of an Indian Tribe; d) incarcerated; e) a veteran; or f) eligible for 
Medicaid or Medicare. 
 7. Plaintiff Eric Novack is a citizen of the United States and the State of Arizona, 
working in the City of Glendale.  Plaintiff Novack is an orthopaedic surgeon who has 
served as a managing partner of his surgery practice since 2007.  Approximately 12.5% 
of his patients are Medicare patients, the services for which are reimbursed by the 
federal government through rates set by Congress and signed into law by the President.   
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 8. Plaintiff Jeff Flake is an elected United States Representative for 
Congressional District 6 of the State of Arizona.  Plaintiff Flake objects to Congress 
exceeding its constitutional powers and burdening his First Amendment expressive 
voting rights as a Representative by delegating nearly unlimited legislative power to a 
federal agency in the executive branch and attempting to entrench federal health care 
regulations from congressional review or repeal through the passage of the Act. 
 9. Plaintiff Trent Franks is an elected United States Representative for 
Congressional District 2 of the State of Arizona.  Plaintiff Franks objects to Congress 
exceeding its constitutional powers and burdening his First Amendment expressive 
voting rights as a representative by delegating nearly unlimited legislative power to a 
federal agency in the executive branch and attempting to entrench federal health care 
regulations from congressional review or repeal through the passage of the Act. 
 10.  Defendant Timothy Geithner is the Secretary of the United States 
Department of the Treasury.  As Treasury Secretary, Defendant Geithner is head of the 
Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) and is responsible for enforcing the Internal Revenue 
Code (“I.R.C.”), including overseeing the collection of taxes and certain penalties 
assessed by the Act.  Defendant Geithner is sued in his official capacity. 
 11.   Defendant Kathleen Sebelius is the Secretary of the United States 
Department of Health and Human Services.  As Secretary of the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services, Defendant Sebelius is principally responsible for 
administering the Act.  Defendant Sebelius is sued in her official capacity. 
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 12.   Defendant Eric H. Holder, Jr., is the Attorney General of the United States.  
As the Attorney General, Defendant Holder is the head of the Department of Justice and 
the chief law enforcement officer of the federal government.  Accordingly, Defendant 
Holder is responsible for enforcing the civil and criminal laws of the United States, 
including the Act.  Defendant Holder is sued in his official capacity.   
 13.   Defendant Barack H. Obama is the President of the United States.  The 
Constitution‟s executive power is vested in the President.  As head of the Executive 
Branch, Defendant Obama is empowered to direct and enforce the laws of the United 
States, including the Act.  Defendant Obama is sued in his official capacity.  
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
The Act Forces Plaintiff Coons to Buy Insurance 
He Does Not Want or Need 
 
 14.    Plaintiff Coons does not currently maintain health insurance coverage.  At 
some time in the future after 2014, Mr. Coons intends to purchase insurance, but only 
that which provides catastrophic coverage with at least a $5,000 deductible. 
 15.     Plaintiff Coons has a greater incentive to maintain his health without 
insurance than he would have with insurance.  Mr. Coons believes that retaining 
freedom of choice over whether to purchase insurance helps him maintain his health and 
stay healthy. 
 16.  Mr. Coons wishes to spend his financial resources for at least the next ten 
years on growing his small business, not on purchasing government-mandated health 
insurance, so that he can create the wealth he needs to enjoy his life to the fullest in his 
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later years.  The individual mandate will force him to divert resources from his business 
and reorder his economic circumstances by either requiring him to obtain government-
approved health insurance, or violate the law by refusing to purchase insurance and pay 
monetary penalties. 
 17.    In 2010, Arizona enacted legislation titled the “Health Care Freedom Public 
Policy.”  Pursuant to its Health Care Freedom Public Policy, Arizona declared: 
A)  The power to require or regulate a person‟s choice in the mode of 
securing lawful health care services, or to impose a penalty related to that 
choice, is not found in the Constitution of the United States of America, 
and is therefore a power reserved to the people pursuant to the Tenth 
Amendment.  This state exercises its sovereign power to declare the public 
policy of this state regarding the right of all persons residing in this state in 
choosing the mode of securing lawful health care services. 
 
B)  It is the public policy of this state, consistent with all constitutionally- 
enumerated rights, as well as those rights otherwise retained by the people, 
that every person in this state may choose or decline to choose any mode 
of securing lawful health care services without penalty or threat of penalty. 
 
C)  The public policy stated in this section does not apply to impair any 
right of contract related to the provision of lawful health care services to 
any person or group. 
 
D)  The public policy stated in this section does not prohibit or limit care 
provided pursuant to article XVIII, §8, Constitution of Arizona, or any 
statutes enacted by the legislature relating to workers' compensation. 
 
E)  A public official or an employee or agent of this state or any political 
subdivision of this state shall not act to impose, collect, enforce or 
effectuate any penalty in this state that violates the public policy prescribed 
in this section. 
 
A.R.S. § 36-1301 (2010). 
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 18.  Additionally, during the November 2010 election cycle, Arizonans passed a 
state constitutional amendment called the Arizona Health Care Freedom Act.  The 
Arizona Health Care Freedom Act provides:  
 To preserve the freedom of Arizonans to provide for their health care a law or 
 rule shall not compel, directly or indirectly, any person, employer or  health care 
 provider to participate in any health care system.  A person or employer may 
 pay directly for lawful health care services and shall not be required to pay 
 penalties or fines for paying directly for lawful health care services, a health 
 care provider may accept direct payment for lawful health  care services and shall 
 not be required to pay penalties or fines for accepting direct payment from a 
 person or employer for lawful health care services.  Subject to reasonable and 
 necessary rules that do not substantially limit a person‟s options, the purchase or 
 sale of health insurance in private  health care systems shall not be prohibited by 
 law or rule. 
 
Ariz. Const. art. XXVII, § 2. 
 19.   By refusing to purchase government-mandated health care coverage starting 
in 2014, Plaintiff Coons will be subject to penalties under PPACA.   
 20.  Specifically, beginning in 2014, the Act will force private citizens, including 
Plaintiff Coons, to purchase health care coverage under penalty of federal law (the 
“individual mandate”).  42 U.S.C. § 1501(b); I.R.C. § 5000A (a) and (b) (2010).  
 21.  The Act forces Plaintiff Coons to purchase insurance with specified 
“minimum essential coverage,” which exceeds coverage that Coons believes he may 
need and requires him to pay for services he may never use.  42 U.S.C. § 1501(b); I.R.C. 
§ 5000A (a) and (f). 
 22.  Plaintiff Coons does not qualify for any exemption or waiver of the 
individual mandate. 
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 23.  If a private citizen such as Plaintiff Coons chooses not to purchase an 
acceptable or minimum essential level of health care coverage, as determined by the 
federal government, monetary penalties will be imposed by Defendants under the Act 
(hereinafter the “individual mandate penalty”).  42 U.S.C. § 1501(b); I.R.C.§ 5000A(b).   
 24.   The amount of the individual mandate penalty is either the sum of “monthly 
penalty amounts” or a flat rate equal to the amount of “the national average premium for 
qualified health plans which have a bronze level of coverage,” whichever is less.  42 
U.S.C. § 1501(b); I.R.C. § 5000A(c)(1).   
 25.   The individual mandate‟s “monthly penalty amounts” are the greater of a 
flat dollar amount or a percentage of income.  The “monthly penalty amounts” are 
imposed according to the following schedule:  $95 in 2014, $325 in 2015, and $695 in 
2016 for the flat fee; or up to 1.0% of taxable income in 2014, 2.0% of taxable income in 
2015, and 2.5% of taxable income in 2016.  I.R.C. § 5000A(c)(2).  After 2016, the 
penalty is subject to yearly cost of living adjustments.  § 5000A(c) (2) and (3). 
 26.  Additionally, citizens such as Plaintiff Coons are subject to separate 
penalties for failing to maintain acceptable coverage for their dependents.  § 5000A (b) 
(1) and (3). 
CAUSES OF ACTION 
Count I 
The Individual Mandate Act Exceeds the Federal  
Government’s Commerce Clause Power 
 
 27.  Plaintiffs reallege, adopt and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 
26 above as though fully set forth herein.  
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 28.   The individual mandate is an essential element of the Act without which 
Congress would not have passed the Act.  
 29.  Defendants have admitted that the insurance-market reform sought by the 
Act is “impossible” if the guaranteed-issue and community reforms contained in the Act 
are not coupled with the individual mandate.   
 30.   The Act contains no severability clause for any of its provisions. 
 31.  Under the Act, otherwise uninsured persons, including Plaintiff Coons, are 
forced to purchase private health care coverage not because they are even tangentially 
engaged in the production, distribution, or consumption of goods, services or 
commodities or any other commercial activity, but simply because they exist.  
 32.  The individual mandate compels uninsured persons to enroll in state 
Medicaid programs if they cannot afford private health care coverage. 
 33.   Imposing the individual mandate upon United States residents, including 
Plaintiff Coons, who choose not to contract for health care coverage as set forth in the 
Act, is not regulating activity. 
 34.  Because Congress‟s authority is not absolute, the power to enact the Act 
must be found in one of Congress‟s enumerated powers in order to be constitutionally 
valid. 
 35.  Congress authored, passed and supports the Act based on an extraordinarily 
broad interpretation of the Commerce Clause.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1501(a) (1)-(2). 
 36.  Adopting Congress‟s interpretation of the Commerce Clause, as is implicit 
in the statute, would fundamentally transform our society by eliminating the vertical 
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separation of power guaranteed by federalism, as well as the related individual liberty 
guarantees found in the Constitution. 
 37.  Before the Act‟s passage, the United States Senate evinced doubt that it had 
the power to adopt the individual mandate under the Commerce Clause.  Because of 
those concerns, the Senate Finance Committee asked the Congressional Research 
Service (“CRS”) to opine on the constitutionality of the individual mandate.  The CRS 
concluded that “[w]hether such a requirement would be constitutional under the 
Commerce Clause is perhaps the most challenging question posed by such a proposal, as 
it is a novel issue whether Congress may use this Clause to require an individual to 
purchase a good or service.”  Jennifer Staman & Cynthia Brougher, Requiring 
Individuals to Obtain Health Insurance: A Constitutional Analysis 3 (Cong. Research 
Serv. July 24, 2009), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40725_20090724.pdf 
(last visited May 9, 2011).  
 38.  As early as 1994, the Congressional Budget Office acknowledged that a 
“mandate requiring all individuals to purchase health insurance would be an 
unprecedented form of federal action.  The government has never required people to buy 
a good or service as a condition of lawful residence in the United States.”  Cong. Budget 
Office, The Budgetary Treatment of an Individual Mandate to Buy Health Insurance 
(August 1994), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/48xx/doc4816/doc38.pdf (last 
visited May 9, 2011).  
 39.  Some members of Congress attempted to justify the Act‟s individual 
mandate by analogizing it to policies requiring drivers to maintain automobile insurance.  
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This analogy is flawed.  The principal purpose of automobile insurance is to provide 
financial protection for others in the event that the driver causes them injury.  Moreover, 
automobile insurance is a conditional exchange for the state issued-privilege of having a 
driver‟s license.  A driver, however, is not mandated to have a driver‟s license or 
automobile insurance unless the driver wishes to drive an automobile on public roads.  
More importantly, driver‟s license and automobile insurance laws are state, rather than 
federal requirements, because the federal government does not have a general police 
power.  
 40.  An individual mandate that requires a citizen to enter into a contract with, or 
buy a particular product from a private party, or to participate in a government health 
care program, with penalties to enforce the mandate, is unprecedented in scope and in 
kind.  Even in wartime, when the production of material is crucial to national security, 
Congress has never claimed a power under the Commerce Clause to force production 
where there is none.  For example, during World War II, the federal government did not 
compel farmers to grow food for troops or workers to build tanks.  While the federal 
government encouraged individuals to buy war bonds to finance the Nation‟s war 
efforts, it never required them to do so under penalty of law.  Clearly, what Congress 
cannot do even at a time when our Nation‟s survival is threatened, it cannot do in 
peacetime simply to avoid the severe political costs of raising taxes to pay for wildly 
unpopular government programs.  
 41.  The immense power now claimed by the federal government and Defendants 
does not comport with either the text or purpose of the Commerce Clause.  The 
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Constitution gives Congress the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, 
and among the several States, and with Indian Tribes.”  U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  The 
Commerce Clause does not give Congress the power to regulate all commerce and 
everything having any effect thereon.  
 42.  Congress may not, under the guise of regulating commerce, expand its 
powers beyond limit.  As Justice Kennedy observes in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 
549, 577 (1995), “Were the federal government to take over the regulation of entire 
areas of traditional state concern, areas having nothing to do with the regulation of 
commercial activities, the boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority 
would blur and political responsibility would become illusory.”  Every activity could be 
argued to affect commerce in some tangential or insignificant way.  Had the founders 
intended the commerce power to be unlimited, enumerating three categories of 
commerce for Congress to regulate would have been unnecessary. 
 43.  Indeed, the enumerated powers are all superfluous and without real effect if 
the commerce power extends to any matter that has any effect on commerce.  Such an 
interpretation violates the traditional rule that the Constitution should not be interpreted 
to render other portions of the document meaningless. 
 44.   For Congress to regulate activity under the Commerce Clause, the activity 
itself must be commercial because “the power to regulate „commerce‟ can by no means 
encompass authority over mere gun possession any more than it empowers the federal 
government to regulate marriage, littering, or cruelty to animals, throughout the 50 
states.  Our Constitution quite properly leaves such matters to the individual States, 
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notwithstanding these activities‟ effects on interstate commerce.”  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 
585 (Thomas, J., concurring).  
 45.  Recently, in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) and Lopez, the 
Court struck down attempts to regulate non-commercial activities based upon their 
predicated effects on interstate commerce because those attempts went beyond the outer 
limits of the Commerce Clause.  Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 25 (2005) (reaffirming 
the principles set forth in Morrison and Lopez). 
 46.  The Supreme Court recognizes that “the mere fact that Congress has said 
when a particular activity shall be deemed to affect commerce does not preclude further 
examination by this Court.”  Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303 (1964); see 
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n., 452 U.S. 264, 311 (1981) 
(Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
 47.  The status of being a citizen of Arizona is not equivalent to being in a 
channel of interstate commerce, nor a person or thing in interstate commerce, nor is it an 
activity arising out of or connected with a commercial transaction.  Indeed, the status 
arises from an absence of commerce, not from some sort of economic endeavor, and is 
not even a non-economic activity affecting interstate commerce.  It is entirely passive. 
 48.  While the Supreme Court has not adopted a categorical rule against 
aggregating the effects of any non-economic activity thus far in our history, the Court 
has never held that the Commerce Clause, even when aided by the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, can be used to require citizens to buy goods or services.  To depart from our 
history and permit the federal government to require individuals to purchase goods or 
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services deprives the Commerce Clause of any effective limit contrary to Lopez and 
Morrison.  It would mutate Congress‟s enumerated powers into a general police power 
in total derogation of the Nation‟s constitutional scheme.  
 49.  Pursuant to Defendants‟ view of the commerce power as applied in defense 
of the individual mandate, Congress could also mandate that everyone buy broccoli.   
 50.  The individual mandate exceeds Congress‟s authority under the Commerce 
Clause.  See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. 
 51.  The individual mandate currently burdens and will continue to burden 
Plaintiff Coons‟ liberty and privacy interests, as well as his quasi-sovereign interest in 
freely exercising his legislative power of initiative and referendum by denying and/or 
diminishing their otherwise lawful scope and effectiveness. 
 52.  The individual mandate injures Plaintiff Coons with current and/or 
threatened economic harm, the inevitability of which is patent.  See, e.g., Okpalobi v. 
Foster, 190 F.3d 337, 350 (5th Cir. 1999).   
 53.  The concrete current and future burdens of the individual mandate are 
currently causing actual and well-founded worry, fear and anguish to Plaintiff. 
Count II 
The Act Exceeds the Implied Power Granted 
By the Necessary and Proper Clause 
 
 54.  Plaintiffs reallege, adopt and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 
53 above as though fully set forth herein.  
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 55.  The Necessary and Proper Clause confers implied supplemental power upon 
the federal government only when the means adopted to exercise an expressly 
enumerated power are:  a) “appropriate”; b) “„plainly adapted to that end‟”; and c) 
“consistent with the letter and spirit of the [C]onstitution.”  Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 39 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 U.S. 316, 421 (1819)). 
 56.  It is axiomatic that the federal government has limited and enumerated 
powers, which are divided and horizontally separated into distinct executive, legislative 
and judicial branches of government.  McCulloch, 4 U.S. at 405 (“The government is 
acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated powers.”); The Federalist No. 14 (James 
Madison) (“[I]t is to be remembered that the general government is not to be charged 
with the whole power of making and administering laws.  Its jurisdiction is limited to 
certain enumerated objects, which concern all the members of the republic, but which 
are not to be attained by the separate provisions of any.  The subordinate governments, 
which can extend their care to all those other subjects which can be separately provided 
for, will retain their due authority and activity.”). 
 57.  Additionally, “our Constitution establishes a system of dual sovereignty 
between the States and the Federal Government.”  Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 
458 (1991).  Indeed, the Constitution‟s great innovation is that “citizens . . . have two 
political capacities, one state and one federal, each protected from incursion by the 
other.”  U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
It is a “legal system unprecedented in form and design, establishing two orders of 
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government, each with its own direct relationship, its own privity, its own set of mutual 
rights and obligations to the people who sustain it and are governed by it.”  Id. 
 58.  The letter and spirit of the Constitution thus guarantees the preservation of 
state sovereignty by requiring the maintenance of a “compound republic” that vertically 
separates powers between the states and the federal government.  See U.S. Const. art. I, 
§ 8 (enumerating congressional powers); id. at art. I, § 10 (limiting powers of the states); 
id. at art. IV, § 4 (guaranteeing the States a Republican Form of Government); id. at art. 
V (incorporating States and Congress into the amendment process); id. at art. VI 
(making federal law supreme); id. at amend. X (reserving to the States powers not 
delegated); id. at amend. XI (making the States immune to suit in federal court); Printz 
v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921-23 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 
187-88 (1992). 
 59.  The Constitution‟s guarantee of a vertical separation of powers is not an 
end-in-itself.  New York, 505 U.S. at 181.  The Founders intended for federalism to 
prevent the abuse of power by diffusing concentrations of power.  Id. at 187-88 
(observing that the Constitution “divides power among sovereigns and among branches 
of government precisely so that we may resist the temptation to concentrate power in 
one location as an expedient solution to the crisis of the day”). 
 60.  The most fundamental purpose of our federal structure is to protect 
individual liberty, and especially those liberties guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.  New 
York, 505 U.S. at 181-82 (citing The Federalist No. 51 (James Madison); Coleman v. 
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 759 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Gregory, 501 U.S. at 
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458).  For federalism to protect individual liberty, there must be a healthy balance of 
power between the States and the federal government.  Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458. 
 61.  It unconstitutionally violates the “very principle of separate state 
sovereignty” for Congress “to compromise the structural framework of dual 
sovereignty.”  Printz, 521 U.S. at 932.  It is equally a violation of that principle for 
Congress to prohibit state sovereignty from serving its basic structural purpose of 
protecting individual liberty. 
 62.  The letter and spirit of the Constitution thus require our system of federalism 
to protect individual liberty and to prohibit any effort to consolidate power in the federal 
government in such a way that the states are prevented from serving this basic structural 
purpose of protecting individual liberty.  
 63.  Arizona enacted the Health Care Freedom Public Policy and Health Care 
Freedom Act to protect the rights of its citizens to participate or not in any health care 
system, prohibit the government from imposing fines on that decision and protect the 
rights of individuals to purchase and doctors to provide lawful medical services without 
fine or penalty. 
 64.  The individual mandate in the Act, as well as any related penalties and 
regulatory authority, is not consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution 
because they consolidate power in the federal government in such a way that the 
separation of powers is ignored, constitutional rights are burdened and the states are 
prevented from serving the basic structural purpose of protecting individual liberty. 
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 65.  The foregoing provisions of the Act are not appropriately or plainly adapted 
to exercising any enumerated power of the federal government. 
 66.  Congress lacks the power under the Necessary and Proper Clause to impose 
the foregoing provisions of the Act. 
Count III 
The Act Exceeds the Federal Government’s Taxing Power 
 67.  Plaintiffs reallege, adopt and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 
66 above as though fully set forth herein.  
 68.   Apart from a tax on income, the federal government has no power under the 
Constitution to levy a direct (capitation) tax unless it is apportioned among the states.  
See U.S. Const., art. I, §§ 3 and 7, cl. 4.  
 69.  Apportionment under the Constitution requires: (1) Congress to declare a 
revenue target for the tax; (2) the required revenue to be divided among the states in 
proportion to their census populations; and (3) each state to divide its required revenue 
by its tax base to produce an individual tax rate. 
 70.  Apart from income taxes, apportioned direct taxes, imposts and duties, the 
federal government may only levy excise taxes.  An excise tax is imposed on the 
performance of an act, the engaging in an occupation or the enjoyment of a privilege. 
 71.  The individual mandate penalty is neither an apportioned direct tax, nor an 
income tax, nor an excise tax, nor an impost or duty. 
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 72.  If it were a tax, the individual mandate penalty could only be classified as an 
unapportioned direct tax, for which the federal government would lack the taxing power 
to levy. 
 73.  If it were a tax, the penalty imposed by the Act to enforce the individual 
mandate would violate the U.S. Constitution. 
 74.  Congress lacks authority under its taxing powers, as delegated by Article I, 
and by implication, the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution, to impose the 
individual mandate penalty. 
 75.  In the Act, Congress did not call the penalty a tax, despite knowing how to 
do so. 
 76.  The individual mandate penalty currently burdens and will continue to 
burden Plaintiff Coons‟ liberty and privacy interests, as well as his quasi-sovereign 
interest in freely exercising his legislative power of initiative and referendum by denying 
and/or diminishing their otherwise lawful scope and effectiveness. 
 77.   The individual mandate penalty injures Plaintiff Coons with current and/or 
threatened economic harm, the inevitability of which is patent.  See, e.g., Okpalobi, 190 
F.3d at 350. 
 78.  The concrete current and future burdens of the individual mandate are 
currently causing actual and well-founded worry, fear, and anguish to Plaintiff. 
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Count IV 
 
The Act Violates the Fifth and Ninth Amendments’ 
Guarantee of Medical Autonomy 
 
 79.  Plaintiffs reallege, adopt and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 
78 above as though fully set forth herein. 
 80.  Plaintiff Coons has the right to control his body, to create or refrain from 
creating a doctor-patient relationship, to accept or refuse medical treatment and to make 
health care choices with the assistance of health care professionals (hereinafter the “right 
to medical autonomy”).  
 81.  Plaintiff Coons‟ right to medical autonomy is a fundamental right that is 
rooted in the Arizona Constitution and state statute, as well as the legally-privileged 
status, privacy and intimacy of the doctor-patient relationship under the Anglo-American 
conception of ordered liberty, and the constitutional rights to life and liberty, which 
imply the right to be left alone by the government to make personal health care 
decisions. 
 82.   Plaintiff Coons‟ right to medical autonomy is protected by the liberty 
guarantees of the Fifth and Ninth Amendments.  See Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 
727, 737 (1984) (Stephens, J., concurring) (observing Ninth Amendment protects rights 
created by state law); Acme, Inc. v. Besson, 10 F. Supp. 1, 6 (D. N.J. 1935) (indicating 
the “local, intimate, and close relationships of persons and property which arise in the 
processes of manufacture” are protected by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments); Magill v. 
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Brown, 16 F. Cas. 408, 428 (E.D. Pa. 1833) (observing “personal rights are protected by 
. . . the 9th amendment”). 
 83.   The individual mandate unduly burdens and places a substantial obstacle in 
the path of Plaintiff Coons exercising his right to medical autonomy by forcing him to 
apply limited financial resources to obtaining a health care plan he does not desire or 
otherwise to save his income to pay a penalty.  Both of these mandates necessarily 
reduce the health care treatments and doctor-patient relationships he can afford to 
choose. 
 84.  The individual mandate unduly burdens and places a substantial obstacle in 
the path of Plaintiff Coons exercising his right to medical autonomy by forcing him to 
create or risk creating an intimate relationship concerning his health and medical care 
with millions of non-physician intermediaries employed by health insurers, rather than 
directly with the physician of his choice.  Depending on the insurance plans available to 
him, Plaintiff Coons‟ choice of physicians and/or medical services may be curtailed.  
 85.  Additionally, the Act unduly burdens and places a substantial obstacle in the 
path of Plaintiff Coons exercising his right to medical autonomy by imposing the threat 
of health care price controls and/or similar regulation that will limit his access to medical 
treatment, hospitals, drugs and physicians. 
 86.  Taken together, the Act‟s individual mandate and related regulatory 
authority, cause irreparable injury by violating Plaintiff Coons‟ right to medical 
autonomy under the Fifth and Ninth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. 
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Count V 
The Act Violates the Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments’ 
Guarantee of Privacy 
 
 87.   Plaintiffs reallege, adopt and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 
86 above as though fully set forth herein. 
 88.  Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, without a search warrant or equivalent 
legal process subject to judicial review, the federal government cannot obtain directly 
from citizens the personal information and medical records the individual mandate 
forces citizens such as Plaintiff Coons to disclose or authorize to be disclosed to health 
plans and health insurance issuers.  
 89.  Nevertheless, the federal government is legally authorized by HIPAA to 
access the personal information and medical records the individual mandate forces 
citizens such as Plaintiff Coons to disclose or authorize to be disclosed to health plans 
and health insurance issuers without genuine consent, a search warrant or equivalent 
legal process subject to judicial review. 
 90.  T he individual mandate circumvents and violates the Fourth Amendment‟s 
guarantee of security against unreasonable searches and seizures by forcing citizens, 
such as Plaintiff Coons, to consent under the threat of a penalty, to authorize access to 
personal medical records and information to health insurance issuers, to which the 
government would also have access.  Without genuine consent, a search warrant or 
equivalent legal process subject to judicial review, the federal government would not 
otherwise have access to citizens‟ personal medical information.  
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 91.   In essence, the individual mandate transforms the insurance application 
process into a conduit by which the federal government can obtain personal medical 
records of citizens such as Plaintiff Coons without genuine consent, a search warrant or 
equivalent legal process subject to judicial review. 
 92.   By depriving and/or threatening to deprive Plaintiff Coons of the ability to 
control access to his medical information, history and records, the individual mandate, 
and related penalty, causes irreparable injury by violating Plaintiff Nick Coons‟ liberty 
and privacy rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments because the mandate 
requires a highly intrusive search and seizure that burdens his liberty interest in 
maintaining confidentiality in his medical information and records, without being 
reasonably related, much less substantially, closely or narrowly tailored, to advancing 
any substantial, important or compelling governmental interest. 
Count VI 
 
The Act’s Establishment and Entrenchment of IPAB Violates 
The First Amendment by Burdening the Legislative Voting Powers of Plaintiffs 
Flake and Franks  
 
 93.   Plaintiffs reallege, adopt and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 
92 above as though fully set forth herein. 
 94.  The Act creates the Independent Payment Advisory Board (“IPAB”), which 
is to be comprised of 15 voting members appointed by the President with the advice and 
consent of the Senate.  The Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Administrator 
of the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services and the Administrator of the Health 
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Resources and Services Administration will serve ex officio as nonvoting members of 
the Board.  42 U.S.C. § 1395kkk(g)(1)(A) (i) and (ii). 
 95.   Beginning in 2014, the Act requires IPAB to make “detailed and specific 
proposals related to the Medicare program.”  § 1395kkk(c)(1)(A) . 
 96.    The Act also requires IPAB to make “recommendations” that “will cause a 
net reduction in total Medicare program spending in the implementation year that is at 
least equal to the applicable savings target.”  § 1395kkk(c)(2)(A)(i) . 
 97.   IPAB‟s regulatory proposal and recommendation powers under the Act are 
not merely advisory; they become law and must be implemented by the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services if Congress does not act to amend them by August 15th of 
each successive session.  § 1395kkk(e)(1) . 
 98.   The Act anticipates and authorizes IPAB to propose and recommend 
regulations for private health care markets and non-federal health care delivery systems 
because IPAB has a statutory obligation to “coordinate” its proposals and 
recommendations with studies of private health care markets and non-federal health care 
delivery systems.  § 1395kkk (c)(2)(B), (n), (o)(1) and (2). 
 99.   Because IPAB is prohibited from directly rationing health care, increasing 
Medicare beneficiary cost sharing, restricting Medicare benefits and modifying 
Medicare eligibility criteria to meet its Medicare spending reduction target, see § 
1395kkk(c)(2)(A), IPAB will inevitably propose and recommend:  a) reductions in 
Medicare payments under parts C and D; b) reduced reimbursement rates to health care 
providers furnishing services to Medicare beneficiaries;  c) restructured reimbursement 
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rates based on a “capitated model,” under which a set amount unrelated to actual supply 
and demand for services will be paid per illness or injury; d) price controls and/or 
pricing mandates and similar regulations for private health care markets and non-federal 
health care delivery systems; and/or e) reductions in appropriations for Medicare 
program spending or other programs which would otherwise increase Medicare program 
spending.  
 100.  When any of IPAB‟s foregoing proposals or recommendations become 
law, or if they are anticipated by health care providers to become law, health care 
providers will withdraw from participating in Medicare and reduce the availability of 
health care services to a greater extent than would otherwise be the case. 
 101.  Reasonable expectations of any of IPAB‟s foregoing proposals or 
recommendations becoming law:  a) discourages entry by individuals into the health care 
professions; b) discourages investment and innovation in health care industries; c) 
reduces the supply of health care providers willing to furnish health services in private 
health care markets and in non-federal health care delivery systems; d) increases demand 
for health care services by consumers in private health care markets and in non-federal 
health care delivery systems in the interim before such regulations become effective; and 
e) causes higher prices for health care services in private health care markets and in non-
federal health care delivery systems in the interim before such regulations become 
effective.  
 102.  According to economist and former U.S. Department of Labor Secretary 
Robert Reich, it is reasonable to expect that health reforms such as those entrusted to 
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IPAB‟s regulatory authority:  a) “means you–particularly you young people–particularly 
you young healthy people–you‟re going to have to pay more”; b) “if you‟re very old–
we‟re not going to give you all that technology and all those drugs for the last couple of 
years of your life to keep you maybe going for another couple of months.  It‟s too 
expensive.  So we‟re going to let you die”; and c) “drug companies and insurance 
companies and medical suppliers [will be forced] to reduce their costs . . . [which] means 
less innovation and that means less new products and less new drugs on the market 
which means you are probably not going to live that much longer than your parents.”  
Audio recording: Robert Reich‟s lecture to Professor Alan Ross‟ political science class 
at the University of California, Berkeley (September 9, 2007), 
http://webcast.berkeley.edu/stream.php?type=download&webcastid=20057 (last visited 
May 9, 2011). 
 103.  The Act entrenches numerous limitations on each House‟s parliamentary 
rules to burden and limit the ability of Representatives and Senators to review, debate, 
modify or reject the IPAB‟s proposals and recommendations before they automatically 
become law and must be implemented by the Secretary of Health and Human Services. 
 104.  The Act‟s entrenched limitations on parliamentary rules for future 
Congresses considering IPAB‟s proposals and recommendations include, but are not 
limited to, the following:  
 A) Upon receipt of IPAB‟s legislative proposal, the majority leader of the House 
 and Senate must introduce the legislation and, if no introduction is made within 
 five days after receipt, any member of the House or Senate may introduce the 
 legislation, whereupon IPAB‟s legislative proposal must be referred “by the 
 Presiding Officers of the respective Houses to the Committee on Finance in the 
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 Senate and to the Committee on Energy and Commerce and the Committee on 
 Ways and Means in the House of Representatives.”  § 1395kkk(d)(1) . 
 
 B)  If IPAB‟s legislative proposal is not acted upon on or before April 1st of the 
 respective session, by the Committee on Finance in the Senate and to the 
 Committee on Energy and Commerce and the Committee on Ways and Means, 
 then the Committee‟s consideration of the same is required to be terminated.   
 § 1395kkk(d)(2). 
 
 C)  If any action is taken on IPAB‟s legislative proposal, the Act requires the 
 House and Senate to enforce parliamentary rules precluding any modification of 
 IPAB‟s proposed legislation that increases total Medicare program spending or 
 that fails to cause “a net reduction in total Medicare program spending in the 
 implementation year that is at least equal to the applicable savings target.”   
 § 1395kkk(d)(3)(B). 
 
 D)  The Act requires the Senate to enforce parliamentary rules precluding more 
 than 30 hours of debate on IPAB‟s legislative proposal, precluding more than 10 
 hours of debate after IPAB‟s legislative proposal returns from conference 
 committee, and precluding more than 1 hour of debate after any veto by the 
 President.  § 1395kkk(d)(4) (B) through (F). 
 
 E)  The Act entrenches the foregoing parliamentary rules by declaring they 
 supersede contrary rules, expressly prohibiting their repeal, and by requiring a 
 three-fifths vote of all of the members of the respective House to waive them.   
 § 1395kkk(d)(3 )(C), (D), (E). 
 
 105.  The Act further entrenches the delegation of legislative powers to IPAB 
and insulates IPAB from congressional review by prohibiting Congress from repealing 
IPAB‟s statutory enabling authority except through a specifically worded “Joint 
Resolution,” which may be proposed only during the year of 2017, before February 1st, 
and passed only upon a three-fifths vote of all members of each House.  § 1395kkk(f).   
 106.  In 2017, Plaintiffs Flake and Franks and other federal legislators only have 
at or about 14 business days to propose such a “Joint Resolution” repealing IPAB‟s 
statutory enabling authority or the Act forever forecloses them from doing so.  
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 107.  The Act thus burdens and/or purports to deny members of Congress, 
including Plaintiffs Representatives Flake and Franks of their legislative power and right 
to consider, review, debate and vote on the legislative proposals of IPAB like any other 
legislative proposal and to repeal IPAB like any other administrative agency that is 
legislatively established. 
 108.  Representatives Flake and Franks and other federal legislators will propose 
legislation, as part of the normal course of their legislative rights and duties, to repeal the 
IPAB provisions of the Act.  Plaintiffs Flake and Franks are discouraged from proposing 
such legislation now and in the future because of the express provisions of the Act that 
unlawfully change rulemaking in Congress and prohibit Congress from considering any 
bill, resolution, amendment or conference report that would repeal IPAB, except 
between January 1, 2017 and January 31, 2017, and only if passed upon a three-fifths 
vote of all members of each House.  § 1395kkk(f). 
 109.  The legislative power of Congress does not include the power to entrench 
legislation from being altered by future Congresses because Congress, by statute, cannot 
alter the constitutional procedure required for the passage of laws.  U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 
1, 7; Reichelderfer v. Quinn, 287 U.S. 315, 318 (1932) (stating that “the will of a 
particular Congress . . . does not impose itself upon those to follow in succeeding 
years”). 
 110.  Correspondingly, the parliamentary rulemaking power of each House does 
not include the power to entrench, by statute, parliamentary rules from alteration by the 
Houses of future Congresses.  See  U.S. CONST., art. I, § 5. 
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 111.  Congress has no power to entrench legislation and parliamentary rules, by 
statute, protecting IPAB‟s proposals, recommendations and enabling statutes from future 
modification, amendment or repeal by future congresses.  See id.  
 112.  Furthermore, to the very extent the Act entrenches IPAB‟s proposals, 
recommendations and enabling statutes from future modification, amendment or repeal 
by future congresses, the Act substantially burdens the voting powers of Plaintiffs U.S. 
Representatives Flake and Franks and other federal legislators. 
 113.  The Act‟s entrenchment of IPAB‟s proposals, recommendations and 
enabling statutes from future modification, amendment or repeal by future congresses, 
burdens substantially more speech than is essential to the furtherance of the federal 
government‟s asserted interests in imposing those restrictions. 
 114.  The Act‟s entrenchment of IPAB‟s proposals, recommendations and 
enabling statutes from future modification, amendment or repeal by future congresses, 
causes irreparable injury by violating the First Amendment voting rights of Plaintiffs 
U.S. Representatives Flake and Franks and other federal legislators. 
Count VII 
The Act’s Establishment of IPAB Violates Separation of Powers Doctrine 
 
 115.   Plaintiffs reallege, adopt and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 
through 114 above as though fully set forth herein.  
 116.   The legislative power of Congress does not include the power to delegate 
legislative authority to an executive agency without an intelligible principle to constrain 
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the exercise of such authority.  A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 
U.S. 495 (1935). 
 117.  IPAB is an executive agency with its members appointed by the President, 
which also has legislative powers, over which there is no meaningful Congressional 
review or any judicial review of its actions.  
 118.  Even where the legislative power of Congress is delegated to an executive 
agency with an intelligible principle to guide its exercise, judicial review must be 
preserved to ensure the agency stays within the bounds set by Congress.  INS v. Chadha, 
462 U.S. 919, 953 n.16 (1983); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425 (1944); 
Lathrop, Shea & Henwood Co. v. Interior Constr. & Improv. Co., 215 U.S. 246, 262 
(1909).  
 119.  By carving out a discrete list of limitations on IPAB‟s delegated powers, 
the Act implicitly gives IPAB otherwise unlimited power to exercise any enumerated 
congressional power with respect to any governmental body, industry, property, product, 
person, service or activity through its proposals and recommendations, provided that 
such exercise “relates” in an undefined way to the Medicare program.  42 U.S.C. § 
1395kkk(c) (1)(A) and (2)(C). 
 120.  Aside from the Act‟s discrete list of limitations on IPAB‟s delegated 
powers, nothing in the Act otherwise prevents IPAB from proposing and recommending 
any kind or magnitude of regulation or taxation of any industry, property, product, 
person, service or activity, which is within the power of Congress to enact, provided 
such regulation or taxation “relates” to the “Medicare program.” 
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 121.  Nothing in the Act precludes IPAB from proposing and recommending the 
appropriation of federal funds and the imposition of conditions on the receipt of such 
funds by any government, industry, property, product, person, service or activity, 
including, but not limited to, conditions requiring states, such as Arizona, to implement 
federal laws or enact new state laws enforcing price controls or pricing mandates in 
order to receive federal funding. 
 122.  The Act provides almost no limit on and no intelligible standards 
constraining the exercise of legislative power by IPAB. 
 123. The Act not only delegates vast legislative powers to IPAB, it purports to 
entrench the delegation of such powers against review by future Congresses, and further 
explicitly prohibits administrative and judicial review of the implementation of IPAB‟s 
proposals and recommendations.  § 1395kkk(e)(5). 
 124.  The Act‟s effort to delegate and entrench IPAB‟s exercise of legislative 
power from congressional and judicial review is beyond the legislative power of 
Congress to enact under the United States Constitution. 
 125.  The Act‟s delegation of vast legislative powers to IPAB without 
intelligible standards, with attenuated congressional review and without judicial review 
violates the doctrine of separation of powers. 
 126.  Congress lacks the constitutional power to establish IPAB under the 
doctrine of separation of powers. 
 127.  The establishment of IPAB currently burdens and will continue to burden 
Plaintiff Flake and Franks and other federal legislators‟ liberty and quasi-sovereign 
Case 2:10-cv-01714-GMS   Document 41    Filed 05/10/11   Page 31 of 37
 Page 32 of 37 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
 
9 
 
10 
 
11 
 
12 
 
13 
 
14 
 
15 
 
16 
 
17 
 
18 
 
19 
 
20 
 
21 
 
22 
 
23 
 
24 
 
25 
 
26 
 
27 
 
28 
 
interests in legislative voting, as well as their constitutional voting duties by contributing 
to the diminishment of their otherwise lawful scope and effectiveness. 
 128.  The Act empowers IPAB to reduce – but not to increase – physician 
Medicare reimbursements in order to achieve a net reduction in total Medicare spending.  
IPAB‟s determinations with regard to Medicare reimbursement become law without 
sufficient oversight by Congress or signature by the President.  IPAB is insulated from 
repeal and the Act does not provide any intelligible principles to control IPAB‟s 
discretion when making these determinations.  By altering the procedure by which Dr. 
Novack and other physicians, including members of his practice, are reimbursed for 
treating Medicare patients, and empowering IPAB to reduce, but not to increase, 
Medicare reimbursements, the statute is imminently likely to decrease his 
reimbursements for services that he renders to Medicare patients, and otherwise 
adversely affects his practice. 
Alternative Count VIII 
 
Non-Preemption 
 
 129.  Plaintiffs reallege, adopt and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 
through 128 above as though fully set forth herein.  
 130.   The Act does not expressly preempt Arizona‟s laws or constitutional 
provisions, such as the Health Care Freedom Public Policy and the Health Care Freedom 
Act. 
 131.  Section § 1555 of PPACA expressly states: 
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No individual, company, business, nonprofit entity, or health insurance 
issuer offering group or individual health insurance coverage shall be 
required to participate in any Federal health insurance program created 
under this Act (or any amendments made by this Act), or in any Federal 
health insurance program expanded by this Act (or any such amendments), 
and there shall be no penalty or fine imposed upon any such issuer for 
choosing not to participate in such programs. 
 
 132.   Accordingly, significant federalism interests would be implicated and 
serious concerns about the Act‟s constitutionality would arise, if the Act‟s individual, 
employer and health exchange mandates, and related penalties and regulations, were 
construed as preempting the Health Care Freedom Public Policy and the Health Care 
Freedom Act. 
 133.   In the alternative to the allegations supporting the constitutional causes of 
action advanced in the preceding paragraphs, the Act does not clearly, directly and 
unequivocally override state laws or constitutional provisions, such as the Health Care 
Freedom Public Policy or the Health Care Freedom Act. 
 134.  In the alternative to the allegations supporting the constitutional causes of 
action advanced in the preceding paragraphs, the Act should not be construed as 
preempting the Health Care Freedom Public Policy or the Health Care Freedom Act. 
 135.    In the alternative to the allegations supporting the constitutional causes of 
action advanced in the preceding paragraphs, the Act should be construed as deferring to 
the Health Care Freedom Public Policy or the Health Care Freedom Act, as legitimate 
exercises of the State of Arizona‟s exclusive Tenth Amendment police, taxing and 
spending authority in accordance with the structural purpose of the American system of 
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federalism, which requires the preservation of individual liberty by diffusing the 
concentration of power. 
 136.  The individual mandate and related penalties and regulations, including the 
recommendations and proposals of IPAB, should be regarded as unenforceable as 
applied within the boundaries of the State of Arizona to the extent they interfere with the 
freedom protected by the Health Care Freedom Public Policy and the Health Care 
Freedom Act. 
REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
 137.   For all of the foregoing reasons, Defendants are without lawful authority 
and/or are acting in violation of the United States Constitution by enforcing and 
threatening to continue to enforce the individual mandate as well as any related penalties 
and regulatory authority, including the establishment, recommendations and proposals of 
IPAB.    
 138.   Plaintiffs have no adequate legal, administrative, or other remedy by 
which to prevent or minimize the continuing and/or threatened irreparable harm from 
Defendants‟ current and threatened enforcement of the foregoing provisions of the Act. 
 139.   An actual live controversy exists between Plaintiffs and Defendants, in 
which the parties have genuine and opposing interests, interests that are direct and 
substantial, and of which a judicial determination will be final and conclusive. 
 140.  Plaintiffs have a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims. 
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 141.  The public interest and equities favor entry of a court order granting 
Plaintiffs the following described declaratory relief, as well as temporary, preliminary 
and permanent injunctive relief. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court: 
 A. Declare the Act to be in violation of the United States Constitution both 
facially and as applied to Plaintiffs and others similarly situated; or, alternatively, 
declare that PPACA does not preempt the Health Care Freedom Public Policy or the 
Health Care Freedom Act, and the mandates, and related penalties and regulations are 
not enforceable within the boundaries of the State of Arizona. 
 B. Declare the individual mandate unconstitutional and non-severable from the 
Act and therefore declare the entire Act unconstitutional and enjoin its enforcement.  
 C. Declare that the IPAB provisions in PPACA are unconstitutional and enjoin 
their enforcement. 
 D. Declare Defendants are acting in violation of the Constitution by enforcing 
and threatening to continue to enforce PPACA against Plaintiffs and others similarly 
situated; or, alternatively, declaring Defendants are acting unlawfully by enforcing and 
threatening to continue to enforce the Act‟s individual mandate, and related penalties 
and regulations, within the boundaries of the State of Arizona; 
 E. Enjoin Defendants and any other agency or employee acting on behalf of the 
United States from enforcing the Act against Plaintiffs, and others similarly situated; or, 
alternatively, enjoining Defendants and any other agency or employee acting on behalf 
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of the United States from enforcing the Act‟s individual mandate, and related penalties 
and regulations within the boundaries of the State of Arizona; and 
 F. Award Plaintiffs their reasonable attorneys‟ fees, litigation expenses and 
costs, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and other applicable law, and 
grant such other relief as the Court may deem just and proper.  
May 10, 2011 
       RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
 
      s/ Diane S. Cohen  
      Clint Bolick 
      Diane S. Cohen 
      Nicholas C. Dranias  
      Christina Kohn 
       GOLDWATER INSTITUTE 
      500 E. Coronado Rd., Phoenix, AZ 85004 
      P: (602) 462-5000 
      Attorneys for Plaintiffs  
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I, Diane S. Cohen, an attorney, hereby certify that on May 10, 2011, I 
electronically filed the attached Plaintiffs‟ Second Amended Complaint with the Clerk 
of the Court for the United States District Court-District of Arizona by using the 
CM/ECF system. 
 
 I certify that all participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users and that 
service will be accomplished by the District Court‟s CM/ECF system. 
 
 
          
              s/ Diane S. Cohen    
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